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Now if the police would come. They need to get a statement. They
should have been here.
We turned to go back to the room.
Which police? I asked.
Exactly, he said.1

INTRODUCTION
Indian Country2 is home to some of the highest rates of violent
crime in the United States.3 Specifically, Indian4 women are much more
likely—in fact, at least twice as likely—as women in any other
demographic to be victims of domestic violence, dating violence, and
1
2

LOUSIE ERDRICH, THE ROUND HOUSE 12 (2012).
For the purposes of this Note, the term “Indian Country” refers to those lands identified in
18 U.S.C. § 1151 including reservations, “dependent Indian communities,” and allotments. 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Section 1151, part of the Major Crimes Act of 1885 and now codified as
18 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1154, defines Indian lands as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term ‘Indian
country’, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
§ 1151.
3 JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42488, TRIBAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA)
REAUTHORIZATION AND SAVE NATIVE WOMEN ACT 1–2 (2012); Kathryn A. Ritcheske,
Liability of Non-Indian Batterers in Indian Country: A Jurisdictional Analysis, 14 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 201, 227 n.4 (2005).
4 There is little consensus on the correct nomenclature for referring to Native peoples in the
United States. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA iii (2007); Amber Halldin, Restoring the Victim
and the Community: A Look at the Tribal Response to Sexual Violence Committed by NonIndians in Indian Country Through Non-Criminal Approaches, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (2008).
In legal scholarship, the term “Indian” tends to be preferred, and most statutes and case law rely
on the definition found at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4). Legal literature, statutes, and cases also use the
term “tribe” to refer to refer to Native Nations. AMNESTY INT’L, supra, at iv; Ritcheske, supra
note 3, at 227 n.1. Other research uses the terms “American Indian” and “Native American.” See,
e.g., Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 800 (2007);
Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 711 n.4
(2006). In international forums, the term “indigenous” is increasingly used by community leaders,
the United Nations, and human rights organizations. AMNESTY INT’L, supra, at iv; see also
Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Women and International Human Rights Law: The Challenges of
Colonialism, Cultural Survival, and Self-Determination, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
187, 189 n.2 (2010). This Note will use these terms interchangeably, but will follow the general
practice in United States legal scholarship and preferentially use the terms “Indian” and “tribe.”
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sexual violence.5 Most Native American women who are victims of
these crimes report that their attacker was non-Indian.6
Despite the prevalence of domestic, dating, and sexual violence in
Indian Country, these crimes are systematically under-investigated and
under-prosecuted.7 When a crime is committed in Indian Country, there
are three potential sovereigns that may claim jurisdiction: the federal
government, the state, and the tribe. Outside of Indian Country,
generally the location of the crime and the domicile of the parties
determine jurisdiction.8 However, in Indian Country, the type of crime,
the identity of the victim, and the identity of the perpetrator control
whether jurisdiction is tribal, state, or federal.9 In Indian Country the
5 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 1–2. Other literature reports rates even higher:
“Statistics published by the Department of Justice in 2004 indicate that Native Americans are 2.5
times more likely to experience rape or sexual assault than all other races in the United States
combined. In fact, 31.4% of Native American and Alaska Native women . . . are likely to be
raped in their lifetimes. Compare this to the 17.7% of White women and 18.8% of AfricanAmerican women likely to be raped . . . .” Amanda M.K. Pacheco, Broken Traditions:
Overcoming the Jurisdictional Maze to Protect Native American Women from Sexual Violence,
11 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 2 (2009); see also Tom F. Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes: Should Non-Indians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority Under VAWA?, 13 ENGAGE:
J. FED. SOC’Y PRAC. GRP. 40, 40 (2012) (citing S. REP. NO. 112-153 (2012)) (stating “nearly
three out of five Native American women had been assaulted by their spouses or intimate
partners, and a nationwide survey found that one third of all American Indian women will be
raped during their life times”); Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty:
Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 185, 188–89 (2008) (“Native American women living in Indian Country experience violent
crimes 50% more often than do young African American males—a group frequently cited as
facing the highest incidence of violent victimization. In fact, 39% of Native American women
report being the victims of domestic violence. Native American women are three times as likely
to be raped or sexually assaulted as women of any other race.”); Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne,
Tangled Up in Knots: How Continued Federal Jurisdiction over Sexual Predators on Indian
Reservations Hobbles Effective Law Enforcement to the Detriment of Indian Women, 41 N.M. L.
REV. 239, 244 (2011) (citing the rate of sexual assault for Native women and two and a half times
that of non-Native women). Even more sobering is the Congressional Research Service’s
observation that “accurate data on violence against women in Indian country are difficult to find
because data about such violence are not systematically collected by Indian tribes and there is a
problem of victims underreporting such crimes.” SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 1 n.2.
6 See, e.g., SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 1 (“Most of this violence involves an
offender of a different race.”); Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of
Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005) (reporting
that 70% of rapes of Native American women identify a white perpetrator); Hart & Lowther,
supra note 5, at 189 (“Over 85% of perpetrators in rape and sexual assault against Native
American women are described by their victims as being non-Indian.”); Pacheco, supra note 5, at
2 (“According to the Department of Justice, nearly 4 in 5 Native American victims of rape and
sexual assault reported the offender as White.”); Painter-Thorne, supra note 5, at 245
(“According to the Justice Department, 86 percent of sexual assaults against Indian women are
perpetrated by non-Indian men.”).
7 Samuel E. Ennis, Case Comment, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction
over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553,
556 (2009).
8 Ritcheske, supra note 3, at 203.
9 Id. Because of these complexities, simple jurisdictional uncertainty has also contributed to
the lack of criminal investigations and prosecutions in Indian Country. Ennis, supra note 7.
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interplay of federal statutes, regulations, tribal law, executive orders,
case law, and treaties creates a “jurisdictional knot” with criminal
jurisdiction overlaps and confusion10 that results in delays in
investigation and lack of prosecution.11
The situation is especially grave in the case of domestic violence,
dating violence, and sexual violence, where the perpetrator is often nonIndian.12 In 1978, Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe13 that tribes do not have the authority to prosecute non-Indians
who commit crimes in Indian Country. The Court reasoned that tribes
have been implicitly divested of this right as a result of history, treaties,
assumptions of Congress, and their status as “dependent nations.”14
Since then, in most states, the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction to try cases involving non-Indian defendants.15 In addition,
in a few states, the state court system has statutory jurisdiction to try
both criminal and civil cases arising in Indian Country. 16 However,

10
11

Painter-Thorne, supra note 5, at 246–47.
In addition to complexity of applicable jurisdictional laws, sources cite a combination of
reasons for the impunity of non-Indian offenders in Indian Country including lack of federal
resources, distance from the Indian lands to prosecutors, overburdened prosecutors, cultural and
language barriers between investigators, victims, and witnesses, and lag time between when the
crime was committed and when an investigation begins. See Pacheco, supra note 5, at 23–24
(“[F]ederal prosecutors . . . already burdened with exceedingly heavy workloads and limited
resources, tended to plead out these cases or not prosecute them at all.”); SMITH & THOMPSON,
supra note 3, at 2–3; Hart & Lowther, supra note 5, at 189; Painter-Thorne, supra note 5, at 241–
42, 246–47; Marie Quasius, Note, Native American Rape Victims: Desperately Seeking an
Oliphant-Fix, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1902, 1906 (2009). For a more searing indictment of the federal
role, see Victor H. Holcomb, Prosecution of Non-Indians for Non-Serious Offenses Committed
Against Indians in Indian Country, 75 N.D. L. REV. 761, 761 (1999) (“Unfortunately, the federal
government does not take its responsibilities as seriously as it should, with the result that Indians
may often be easy prey for non-Indian criminals, who may target the reservation lands for this
very reason. This lax enforcement is particularly pronounced in the area of non-serious offenses,
on which the federal government is less inclined to expend its resources.”).
12 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
13 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
14 Id. In addition, tribal jurisdiction is also limited by statute. After the Major Crimes Act of
1885, tribes generally do not have jurisdiction to try most major crimes, including rape. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1151–1154 (2012). Tribes still retain the right to try Indians (both members and non-members)
who commit crimes against other Indians that do not fall into the Major Crimes Act. United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–99 (2004); SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 6–7.
15 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191.
16 Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 589 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
and 28 U.S.C. § 1360). Under Public Law 280, states were either granted mandatory jurisdiction
by Congress in 1953, or “opted in” between 1953 and 1968. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public
Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405,
1406–07 (1997). In the wake of termination era policies and perceived “lawlessness” on
reservations (as well as possibly in an attempt to reduce federal caseloads), Congress enacted
Public Law 280, which delegated congressional jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters in
Indian Country to certain state governments. Id. at 1406; Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in
No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 915–16 (2002). The bill included six mandatory states,
Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, with carve out provisions for
the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota and the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon. Goldberg-
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whether the jurisdictional responsibility falls on state or federal
prosecutors, this scheme has in effect created a jurisdictional gap 17 that
has wreaked havoc on Native communities.18
In recent years, human rights groups and the media have
highlighted the growing crisis occurring in Indian Country.19 Indeed,
Congress too took notice, and in an effort to address the impunity of
non-Indian defendants in cases of domestic violence, dating violence,
and sexual violence in Indian Country, passed sections 904 and 905 of
the Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013 (VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013).20 Sections 904 and 90521 outline special
Ambrose, supra, at 1406 n.7. In addition, the law contained an opt-in provision for other states to
unilaterally become a “P.L. 280 state” without tribal consent. Id. at 1406. Over the next 15 years,
nine states opted in to Public Law 280 until, amidst outrage from Native communities and
scholars, Congress amended the statute to require tribes to consent to P.L. 280 jurisdiction. Id. at
1407–08 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1326). Since then, no tribe has consented and no new states have
gained criminal and civil jurisdiction under P.L. 280. Id. at 1408.
17 Nicolas, supra note 16, at 915–16. Thus, “if the federal or state governments choose not to
prosecute, the offenders of such violent acts remain unpunished simply because the women they
chose to assault happened to be Native.” Pacheco, supra note 5, at 3.
18 Some scholars have noted the particularly devastating effect sexual violence has had on
Indian communities because of the confluence of traditional community values and the histories
of colonization and its accompanying legacy of violence. See, e.g., Halldin, supra note 4, at 3–4;
Pacheco, supra note 5, at 5–7.
19 In 2006, Amnesty International published an extensive report detailing many of the
historical, jurisdictional, and social barriers to bringing perpetrators of domestic violence and
sexual violence to justice in Indian Country. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 4. The report found that
there are also significant practical problems in both enforcement and effective gathering of
forensic evidence in crimes of sexual and domestic violence in Indian Country. Noting that
“[o]ver the past decade, federal government studies have consistently shown that American
Indian and Alaska Native women experience much higher levels of sexual violence than other
women,” id. at 2, the report urged for the collection of more data and congressional action to help
mitigate the human rights abuses occurring in Indian Country. Id. at 5, 8. In addition, the issue
gained national recognition when in 2007 as part of a two part series, NPR reported on the lack of
investigation in domestic violence and sexual violence cases on Indian lands and the
jurisdictional issues facing tribal, federal, and state law enforcement. Laura Sullivan, Legal
Hurdles Stall Rape Cases on Native Lands, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 26, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12260610; Laura Sullivan, Rape Cases on
Indian Lands Go Uninvestigated, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 25, 2007), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=12203114. National media sources continue to highlight the
ongoing struggle with lawlessness and domestic violence in Indian Country. See, e.g., Editorial,
Lawlessness on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, at A34.
20 The Senate passed Violence Against Women Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013), on
February 12, 2013. See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, VAWA Vote: Senate Overwhelmingly Passes
Violence Against Women Act, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/12/vawa-vote_n_2669720.html. The House passed S. 47
on February 28, 2013. See, e.g., Ashley Parker, House Renews Violence Against Women
Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, at A13.
21 The Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 904–05,
127 Stat. 54; see also Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, H.R. 11, 113th Cong.
(2013) (enacted); Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013)
(enacted); Violence Against Women Act of 2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (as passed by Senate,
Apr. 26, 2012). Each of these bills, as well as the final passed legislation contained the provisions
discussed in this Note identified as §§ 904 and 905. Thus, citation to §§ 904 and 905 refers to the
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domestic violence jurisdiction that tribes may exercise over certain nonIndian defendants who commit crimes of domestic violence, dating
violence, and sexual violence in Indian Country. 22 President Barack
Obama signed these provisions on March 7, 2013,23 and they will go
into effect on March 7, 2015.24
From introduction to passage,25 sections 904 and 905 have sparked
heated debate amongst politicians, tribes, news media, and advocacy
groups.26 At their core, these debates can be distilled into an inquiry into
identical language in Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013 and all three bills.
22 The Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54.
The provisions ultimately passed in the Violence Against Women Act were first introduced in
October of 2011 in the SAVE Native Women Act, S. 1763. In early 2012, each house
incorporated these provisions into drafts of the Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of
2012 in S. 1925 and H.R. 4970. The provisions passed in the Senate in S. 1925 but were removed
from the final version of H.R. 4970 passed in the house. Both bills remained unresolved at the
close of the 112th Congress. Compare S. 1925, with H.R. 4970. On January 22, 2013, the House
and the Senate again reintroduced the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 as House Bill 11 and
Senate Bill 47. Violence Against Women Act of 2013, H.R. 11, 113th Cong. (2013); Violence
Against Women Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013). The language of both these bills is
identical to that found in the passed version in the Senate of Violence Against Women Act of
2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2012), and the proposed versions of the Violence Against Women
Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012), the SAVE Native Women Act, H.R. 4154, 112th
Cong. (2011), and the SAVE Native Women Act, S. 1763, 112th Cong. (2011).
23 The Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54.
See also, Joseph Biden & Barack Obama, Remarks by the President and Vice President at
Signing of the Violence Against Women Act, Transcript, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (March 7,
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/03/07/lets-move-faithand-communities-challenge-winners#transcript.
24 According to a Department of Justice fact sheet published after the passage of VAWA,
“[a]lthough tribes can issue and enforce civil protection orders now, generally tribes cannot
criminally prosecute non-Indian abusers until at least March 7, 2015.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, VAWA 2013 AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIAN
PERPETRATORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2013), [OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE], available at
http://www.justice.gov/tribal/docs/vawa-2013-tribal-jurisdiction-overnon-indian-perpetratorsdomesticviolence.pdf (last revised June 14, 2013) (emphasis omitted). However, “[a] tribe can
start prosecuting non-Indian abusers sooner than March 7, 2015 if [(1) t]he tribe’s criminal justice
system fully protects defendants’ rights under federal law; [(2) t]he tribe asks to participate in the
new Pilot Project; and [(3) t]he Justice Department grants the tribe’s request and sets a starting
date.” Id.
25 The first proposed legislation included the Stand Against Violence and Empower (SAVE)
Native Women Act, S. 1763, 112th Cong. (2011), introduced in October 2011. The House
counterpart was introduced as Stand Against Violence and Empower (SAVE) Native Women
Act, H.R. 4154, 112th Cong. (2011). Since then, similar provisions have been introduced in the
Violence Against Women Act of 2013, H.R. 11, 113th Cong. (2013); Violence Against Women
Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013); Violence Against Women Act of 2012, H.R. 6625, 112th
Cong. (2012); Violence Against Women Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012); Violence
Against Women Act of 2012, H.R. 4271, 112th Cong. (2012); Violence Against Women Act of
2012, H.R. 4982, 112th Cong. (2012); and Violence Against Women Act of 2012, S. 1925, 112th
Cong. (2011).
26 See, e.g., Laura Clawson, Weakened, Flawed, Republican Violence Against Women Act
Passes House, DAILY KOS (May 16, 2012, 2:31 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/05/16/
1092180/-Weakened-flawed-Republican-Violence-Against-Women-Act-passes-House#; Jonathan
Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2013, at
A11; Drew White, Lame Duck Update: VAWA Does Violence to the U.S. Constitution, HERITAGE
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the source of Congress’s power to pass such legislation and the limits, if
any, on that power. Some have argued that Congress has the authority to
“expand” the limits it has historically placed on inherent tribal
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian Country.27
Conversely, others have noted that if Congress has already implicitly or
explicitly extinguished tribes’ inherent sovereignty, this legislation
should be considered a delegation of congressional jurisdictional
power.28 The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on this question.
However, some Supreme Court opinions seem to indicate that the Court
would consider the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 a delegation of
Congress’s power,29 while others indicate that the Court would find the
Act to be an expansion of inherent sovereignty.30
Upon such a challenge, the Court would be required to determine
the source of Congress’s power to enact the legislation: either under a
theory of delegation or a theory of inherent sovereignty. 31 However,
both would require the Court to partially overrule its decision in
Oliphant that divested tribes of the right to try non-Indians who commit
crimes on Indian land.32 Scholars have long argued for Congress to pass
this type of legislation that would overrule Oliphant,33 and statutory
abrogation of a prior Supreme Court decision is not without precedent
in federal Indian law.34 In United States v. Lara,35 the Court upheld
ACTION FOR AM.: THE FORGE BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012), http://heritageaction.com/2012/12/lameduck-update-vawa-does-violence-to-the-u-s-constitution; Betsy Woodruff, No Way to Protect the
Vulnerable: Democrats’ Changes to the Violence Against Women Act Are Just Political
Posturing, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 24, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
articles/336143/no-way-protect-vulnerable-betsy-woodruff. See also supra notes 5–7, 19 and
accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 7, at 573–76. For a discussion of the inherent sovereignty
theory, see infra Part II.A.
28 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 7–14; Gede, supra note 5, at 44.
29 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 227 (2004) (Souter, J. and Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[A]ny tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers necessarily rests on a
‘delegation’ of federal power.”); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978)
(“Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such
power by Congress.”). For further explanation of the delegation theory, see infra Part II.A.
30 Lara, 541 U.S. at 194 (upholding the validity of Congress’s actions “enact[ing] a new
statute, relaxing restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States
recognizes”). For further explanation of the inherent sovereignty theory, see infra Part II.A.
31 See infra Part II.A.
32 Gede, supra note 5, at 40.
33 Id. (“Scholarly literature, policy studies and political analysis have heavily criticized the
decision . . . . Oliphant has long been considered by tribes and tribal advocates as a wound in the
side of federal Indian law and policy; it has been described as ‘the most serious judicial onslaught
on tribal territorial sovereignty.’” (quoting Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An
Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument Before the American Indian Nations Supreme Court,
13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (2003))).
34 Lara, 541 U.S. at 193. In Lara, the Court considered “a congressional statute
‘recogniz[ing] and affirm[ing]’ the ‘inherent’ authority of a tribe to bring a criminal misdemeanor
prosecution against an Indian who is not a member of that tribe-authority that this Court
previously held a tribe did not possess . . . [and] whether Congress has the constitutional power to
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congressional action that amended the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
and expanded inherent tribal jurisdiction to non-members,36 explicitly
abrogating the Court’s earlier decision in Duro v. Reina.37 Following
this legislative abrogation model, as well as the theory of inherent tribal
sovereignty approved in Lara, sections 904 and 905 of the VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013 legislatively correct the mistakes of Oliphant
through an expansion of the bounds of inherent tribal sovereignty. 38
Now, upon the foreseeable challenge to this law,39 the Supreme Court
will be asked to determine the source of congressional power to enact
these special domestic violence jurisdiction provisions.
While Lara provides a good model for the procedure required to
validate sections 904 and 905 of the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013,
substantively the Court’s reasoning need not, and should not, rely solely
on that case.40 Rather, the Court should couple any reliance on recent
jurisprudence with a back-to-basics analysis that incorporates the early
theories of sovereignty and self-determination that underpin federal
Indian law, including a close textual reading of the Constitution and the
normative rules of early case law. The twists and turns of Federal Indian
law have created convoluted jurisprudence that has allowed the Court to
select from a variety of policy perspectives each time a case is argued
before it. However, this Note argues that in moving forward justly in
federal Indian law, upon a constitutional challenge to the special
domestic violence jurisdiction of sections 904 and 905, the Court should
return to the texts that form the basis of the early outlook on tribal

relax restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on the exercise of a tribe’s
inherent legal authority. [The Court] conclude[d] that Congress does possess this power.” Id. at
196.
35 See id. at 206–07 (upholding a congressional amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act
which overruled Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), and granted tribes the right to try nonmember Indians in tribal court under a theory of expansion of inherent tribal sovereignty).
36 Id. at 210. A non-member of a particular tribal jurisdiction is a person who is a member of
another tribe, but not a member of the prosecuting tribe.
37 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (holding “that the retained sovereignty of the tribe
as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the authority to
impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own membership”).
38 See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 7; Elise Helgesen, Allotment of Justice: How U.S. Policy in
Indian Country Perpetuates the Victimization of American Indians, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
441 (2011); M. Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and
DOJ’s Proposed Fix, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 117 (2012); Washburn, supra note
4.
39 With the exception of an opt-in Pilot Project, §§ 904 and 905 will go into effect March 7,
2015. OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, supra note 24.
40 Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should overturn Oliphant based on the
reasoning present in Lara. Pacheco, supra note 5, at 40–41; Laura E. Pisarello, Comment,
Lawless by Design: Jurisdiction, Gender and Justice in Indian Country, 59 EMORY L.J. 1515,
1532–33 (2010); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall
Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration
of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 699–701 (2009).
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sovereignty—namely the Constitution and the Marshall Trilogy.41
Within these foundational principles of inherent tribal sovereignty, the
Court should, as it has many times in past federal Indian law cases,42
look to the legislative intent of Congress to confirm that Congress has
validly exercised its power to expand inherent tribal sovereignty.
However, the Court should not stop there. In explicating the source of
Congress’s power to enact the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013, the
Court should clarify that the source of Congress’s power to enact such
legislation is not governed by the sweeping doctrine of plenary
powers.43 Rather, it is consistent with a more limited view of Congress’s
power to legislate in Indian Country that requires legislation to be
rationally related to Congress’s unique obligations to the Indian tribes.44
In taking this approach, this Note argues that the Court should find that
sections 904 and 90545 are both a valid exercise of Congress’s power to
expand tribal inherent sovereignty and consistent with Congress’s
unique obligation to the tribes.
Part I of this Note outlines the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013,
as well as the case law that it seeks partially to abrogate. Part II.A
examines the delegation and inherent sovereignty theories more closely,
and argues that inherent tribal sovereignty is the superior mechanism for
41 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). See infra Part II.B and Part
II.C.
42 Examples where the Court considered extensively legislative history in the context of the
questions discussed in this Note include United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199–204 (2004);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201–06 (1978); and Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 541–48 (1974).
43 Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict Among the
Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REV.
127, 137 (1993). The plenary powers doctrine was initially described in United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886). There the Court found a statute, the Major Crimes Act of 1885, was
constitutional not under the commerce clause as argued by the parties, but rather under a new
doctrine of plenary powers, which the Court explained as: “[t]he power of the general government
over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, [which] is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must
exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has never been denied;
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.” Id. at 384–85.
44 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (“As long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed.”). See infra Part III. In explicating this “unique obligation,” the
Court held that the federal government has a fiduciary obligation to the tribes. Seminole Nation v.
United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942) (“[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive
obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and
sometimes exploited people . . . . In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the
Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed
policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this
Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its
conduct . . . should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.”).
45 See infra Part I.A.
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validating the Act. Parts II.B, II.C, and II.D review the basic textual
authority that should form the foundation of the Court’s analysis, and
conclude that this authority supports recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty. Part III addresses counter arguments to this approach, and
argues that, in upholding sections 904 and 905, the Court need not
affirm the sweeping doctrine of plenary powers, but rather may validate
theses sections under a more limited test of Congress’s role in Indian
Country which requires that any congressional action be rationally
related to Congress’s unique obligation to the tribes. This Note
concludes that, in analyzing the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013, the
Court should uphold the congressional action as a valid expansion of
inherent tribal sovereignty while carefully clarifying that this validation
does not necessitate an affirmation of the plenary power doctrine, but
rather is linked to a more limited approach of congressional power to
legislate in Indian Country.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Violence Against Women Act and the 2013 Reactivation Bill

In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994.46 The law provided comprehensive education, prevention
programs, and victims’ services to combat domestic violence and dating
violence.47 VAWA has since been reauthorized three times, in 2000,
2005, and 2013.48 The most recent version of VAWA, passed in 2013,
includes new provisions outlining concurrent “special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction”49 of tribes in Indian Country.50 Sections 904 and
46 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
47 Id.; see also Helgesen, supra note 38, at 463 (“This federal legislation applied to the
victims of sexual violence all over America, including Indian country. On American Indian lands,
the effect of VAWA was to provide awareness of the suffering of victims of domestic violence,
dating violence, sexual assault and stalking, as well as to provide a greater array of services for
those victims.”); Robin R. Runge, The Evolution of a National Response to Violence Against
Women, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 429, 429 (2013) (“The Violence Against Women Act of
1994 (VAWA 1994) was the first comprehensive legislative effort to create a national response to
the epidemic of violence against women. VAWA 1994 had lofty goals, including shifting
attitudes regarding violence against women through the creation of specific legal protections,
improved enforcement, increased access to existing legal structures, funding for public education,
training for service providers, and expanded services for victims.”).
48 Runge, supra note 47, at 430. The funding provisions of VAWA must be reauthorized
every five years. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
49 Specifically, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(1) recognizes “the powers of self-government of
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905 of the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 declare that tribes will
have concurrent51 jurisdiction with the federal government to prosecute
dating, sexual, and domestic violence crimes occurring in Indian
Country.52 The Act recognizes the power of tribes to exercise special
domestic violence jurisdiction53 based on their inherent powers of
sovereignty.54 However, the language is “narrowly crafted and satisfies
a clearly identified need”:55 the provisions specifically apply to
domestic violence, dating violence, and protective order violations,
crimes where lack of reporting, investigation, and prosecution in Indian
Country are the highest. The Act does not include other violent crime.56
a participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and
affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.” The Act
defines “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” as “the criminal jurisdiction that a
participating tribe may exercise under this section but could not otherwise exercise.” Pub. L. No.
113-4, § 904(a)(6). These provisions were first introduced as part of the Stand Against Violence
and Empower Native Women Act (SAVE Native Women Act), H.R. 4154 and S. 1763, 112th
Cong. (2011), which was originally proposed “[t]o decrease the incidence of violent crimes
against Indian women, to strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise the sovereign
authority of Indian tribes to respond to violent crimes committed against Indian women, and to
ensure that perpetrators of violent crimes committed against Indian women are held accountable
for that criminal behavior . . . . ” H.R. 4154 and S. 1763. These provisions were reintroduced in
112th Congress in the Violence Against Women Act of 2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2011), but
died without a vote at the end of 2012. VAWA was reintroduced in the 113th Congress and
passed, with §§ 904 and 905, in 2013. Sections 904 and 905 were taken nearly in their entirety
from S. 1763 in drafting S. 1925, and these sections were again replicated in Pub. L. No. 113-4,
§ 904–05. Compare S. 1925, with S. 1763, and Pub. L. No. 113-4 § 904–05; see also S. REP. NO.
112-153, at 8 (2012).
50 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(a)(3). The bill defines Indian Country per 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(2012). See supra note 2.
51 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(2).
52 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(1). This provision, originally proposed in the SAVE Native
Women Act, was the result of years of direct consult with tribal leaders and Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs hearings from 2007 to 2011. S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 8 & n.20 (2012). As a product
of these meetings which specifically addressed public safety and violence against women, as well
as consultations and hearings by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the SAVE Native
Women Act was introduced on October 31, 2011. Id. at 8. Sections 904 and 905 “incorporat[ed] a
provision almost identical to section 201 of the SAVE Native Women Act into th[e]
reauthorization of VAWA.” Id. at 9.
53 The bill “recognize[s] and affirm[s]” that “the powers of self-government of a participating
tribe include the inherent power of that tribe . . . to exercise special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction over all persons.” Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(1). The term “participating tribe”
means a tribe that elects to exercise the special jurisdiction. Id. § 904(a)(4).
54 The Act thus explicitly recognizes what has been termed the “inherent tribal sovereignty
theory.” Scholarly proponents of this theory argue that since tribes retain their inherent
sovereignty that has only been constrained by Congress, under the proposed legislation, Congress
may remove those constraints and restore tribes’ power to prosecute non-Indian perpetrators of
domestic, dating and sexual violence. Ennis, supra note 7, at 556. See infra Part II.A for a full
discussion of this theory.
55 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 10 (2012).
56 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(c) (“A participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction over a defendant for criminal conduct that falls into one or more of the
following categories: (1) domestic violence and dating violence . . . (2) violations of protective
orders.”); see also S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9.
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The special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction does not apply when
neither the victim nor the defendant is Indian,57 nor when the defendant
lacks sufficient ties to the community. 58 Further, a defendant prosecuted
under this bill is protected by the rights enumerated under the Indian
Civil Rights Act section 202(c),59 the right to trial by a jury that contains
a fair cross section of the community including non-Indians,60 and all
other rights “necessary” for Congress to “recognize and affirm the
inherent power” of a participating tribe to exercise this special
jurisdiction.61 In sum, sections 904 and 905 apply only to crimes of
domestic violence, dating violence, and sexual violence by a non-Indian
who has sufficient ties to the participating tribe’s community. 62 Thus,

57
58

Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(4)(A)(i); see also S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9.
Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(4)(B). The tribe may only exercise this special jurisdiction if
the defendant resides in Indian Country of the participating tribe, is employed in the Indian
Country of the participating tribe, or is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of a member
of the participating tribe, or is an Indian who resides in the Indian Country of the participating
tribe. Id. § 904(b)(4)(B)(i)–(iii).
59 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(d)(2) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012)). In cases where the
defendant is eligible for a term of incarceration of more than one year, the defendant has the right
to effective assistance of counsel and to the appointment of counsel at the tribe’s expense if the
defendant is indigent. The tribe is also required to have a presiding judge with “sufficient legal
training” who is barred in at least one state to practice law, to have the tribal laws and court
procedural rules freely available, and to record the court proceedings. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012).
Under the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) of 2010, Congress expanded the maximum
incarceration sentence from one to three years if the tribe provides a right to effective assistance
of counsel and counsel free of charge for indigent defendants. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010) (as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 25, 28,
and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
60 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(d)(3).
61 Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(d)(4). The precise meaning of this language goes to the heart of
the inherent sovereignty and delegation debate. However, in clarifying these requirements, the
Senate Majority debates on Senate Bill 1925 verified that Congress considers the language to
invoke a theory of inherent sovereignty. The Senate Majority stated “tribes would be required to
protect effectively the same constitutional rights as guaranteed in State court criminal
proceedings. Rather than finding their basis in the Constitution, these rights are guaranteed
through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended in 1986 and 1990, and through the Tribal
Law and Order Act.” S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 10 (2012). Incorporating § 904(d)(1)–(4), all
defendants in tribal court would be guaranteed at least the right to effective assistance of counsel,
the right of indigent defendants to assistance of a licensed attorney, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, the right against double jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy and public trial, the right to know what the defendant is accused of, the right
against excessive bail or fines, the right against cruel and unusual punishment, the right to not be
deprived of property without due process of law, the right to trial by jury of no less than six
persons when the offense is punishable by imprisonment, and the right to petition a Federal Court
for habeus corpus.
62 As the Office of Tribal Justice’s fact sheet clarifies, “covered offenses will be determined
by tribal law. But tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians will be limited to the following,
as defined in VAWA 2013: [d]omestic violence; [d]ating violence; and [c]riminal violations of
protection orders.” OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, supra note 24. What is not covered is crimes
committed outside Indian Country; crimes between two non-Indians, crimes between two
strangers, including sexual assaults; crimes committed by a person who lacks sufficient ties to the
tribe; child abuse or elder abuse that does not involve the violation of a protective order. Id.
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from a practical perspective, while not necessarily simplifying the
“jurisdictional maze”63 that is federal Indian law, the Act creates a
jurisdictional overlap that will at least fill what has become an empirical
jurisdictional void in Indian Country.64
Although the passage of sections 904 and 905 of the VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013 were hotly debated on both sides of the aisle,65
the dialogue urging the passage of this type of legislation is not new:
scholars of federal Indian law and advocates for women’s and Native
rights have called for action such as that found in sections 904 and 905
for over thirty years.66 Since Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe held
that tribes had been implicitly divested of their right to try non-Indians
as a result of history, treaties, assumptions of Congress, and their status
as “dependent nations,”67 many have argued that Oliphant should be
overturned,68 and in particular, scholars and advocates have urged
Congress to statutorily abrogate the decision in order to restore tribal
criminal jurisdiction. Now that Congress has done so, the Supreme
Court should uphold the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 as a valid
expansion of inherent tribal sovereignty.69

63 This term was first coined by Robert N. Clinton in his 1976 article Criminal Jurisdiction
over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 503–04
(1976). Scholars continue to use this term, and terms like it. See Joseph Chilton, Jurisdictional
“Haze”: An Examination of Tribal Court Contempt Powers over Non-Indians, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1189 (2012); Pacheco, supra note 5, at 1.
64 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 1.
65 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979). The line
of cases that scholars have urged to abrogate initiated with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978) and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), which established the
doctrine of “implicit divestiture.” This doctrine argues that in addition to those rights explicitly
divested from tribes, tribes have also been divested of additional rights “implicitly” as a result of
historical practice and their unique status.
67 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). That same year the Court also
decided United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), which affirmed the holding of Oliphant.
68 See Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Trapped in the Spring of 1978: The Continuing Impact of the
Supreme Court’s Decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Martinez, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2008, at
37; Gede, supra note 5, at 40; Kevin Meisner, Modern Problems of Criminal Jurisdiction in
Indian Country, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 175, 186 (1992); Pisarello, supra note 40, at 1518; Amy
Radon, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on
the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 1275, 1290 (2004); Kevin K. Washburn, Federal
Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006).
69 See, e.g., N. Bruce Duthu, Op-Ed., Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2008, at A17; Ennis, supra note 7, at 553, 556; Pisarello, supra note 40, at 1532–33, 1551–52;
Matthew Handler, Tribal Law and Disorder: A Look at A System of Broken Justice in Indian
Country and the Steps Needed to Fix It, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 261, 299–300 (2009); Helgesen,
supra note 38, at 469–71; Holcomb, supra note 11, at 799; Pacheco, supra note 5, at 40; Radon,
supra note 68, at 1275; Washburn, supra note 4, at 775–76; Lindsey Trainor Golden, Note,
Embracing Tribal Sovereignty to Eliminate Criminal Jurisdiction Chaos, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1039, 1066–67 (2012).
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The Legacy of Oliphant

The Court’s controversial 1978 decision in Oliphant garnered a
significant negative response from scholars.70 In Oliphant, the
Suquamish Indian tribe brought proceedings in tribal court in two
separate cases against defendants Mark David Oliphant and Daniel M.
Belgrade.71 Oliphant was prosecuted for assaulting a tribal officer and
resisting arrest.72 Belgrade was charged with reckless endangerment and
damage to tribal property.73 Oliphant and Belgrade challenged the
Suquamish tribe’s jurisdiction to prosecute them as non-Indians.74 The
Court held that without an affirmative delegation from Congress, tribes
do not have jurisdiction to try non-Indians.75 In reaching this decision,
the Court relied heavily on the “implicit” historical understanding of
tribal power and the intentions of Congress based on statute and
treaties,76 as well as some selected case law.77 The Court reasoned that
“[u]pon incorporation” tribes relinquished some sovereign powers to
Congress, and over time implicitly were divested of others.78 Thus,
tribes could not exercise those powers expressly terminated by
Congress, nor those that had been implicitly divested because those
powers would be “inconsistent with their status.”79
The Court’s conclusion that tribes did not have jurisdiction to try
non-Indians sent shockwaves though Native communities and scholars
of Federal Indian law.80 Since that time, many scholars have specifically
criticized Oliphant and called for the case to be overturned or statutorily
abrogated.81 Most recently, scholars have advocated for Congress to
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

N. BRUCE DUTHU, NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW 20–21 (2008).
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 203–08.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id. (citing Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 435 U.S. 191
(1978)).
80 See, e.g., Barsh & Henderson, supra note 66; William D. Holyoak, Comment, Tribal
Sovereignty and the Supreme Court’s 1977–1978 Term, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (1978); Steven
M. Johnson, Note, Jurisdiction: Criminal Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems on Indian
Reservations in the Wake of Oliphant, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291 (1979).
81 See, e.g., DUTHU, supra note 70; Fletcher, supra note 68; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C. L. 45, 100 (2012); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age
of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE
L.J. 1, 34–39 (1999); John P. LaVelle, Suquamish Indian Tribe, Petitioner v. Oliphant et al.,
Respondents, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69 (2003); Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A
New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48 (2010); Judith V.
Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument Before the
American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (2003).

SAYLER.DENOVO - Clean - Final Copy (Do Not Delete)

2014

B A C K TO B A S I C S

1/3/2014 4:07 PM

15

abrogate the decision in Oliphant, a so-called “Oliphant-fix,” modeled
after similar congressional action82 that statutorily overturned the
Supreme Court decision in Duro v. Reina.83 In Duro, the Court
considered a related jurisdictional question: whether a tribe has
jurisdiction to try an Indian defendant who is a non-member of that
particular tribe when the individual commits a crime on the tribe’s
land.84
Initially, the Supreme Court answered this question in the
negative.85 In Duro v. Reina, an Indian who was a non-member of the
prosecuting tribe, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa, allegedly shot and
killed a member of a third tribe on the Pima-Maricopa’s reservation.86
The Defendant filed for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the PimaMaricopa’s jurisdiction over him because he was a non-member.87
Relying on Oliphant, the Supreme Court held that the tribe did not have
jurisdiction to try a non-member Indian who committed a crime on that
tribe’s land.88 However, six months after this decision was handed
down, Congress passed legislation that amended the Indian Civil Rights
Act (IRCA) which explicitly recognized a tribe’s right to try a nonmember Indian for crimes committed in Indian Country. 89 Specifically,
this legislation stated that tribes do in fact have inherent jurisdiction to
try non-member Indians.90
In 2004, the Court had the opportunity to weigh in on this “Durofix” legislation. In United States v. Lara,91 the Court, after noting the
clear directive of Congress, found that the tribe did have jurisdiction to
try a non-member who committed a crime on the prosecuting tribe’s
reservation.92 In that case, Billy Jo Lara, an enrolled member of the
82 The statute, which abrogated the holding of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), is referred
to as the “Duro-fix.” Ennis, supra note 7, at 556. The Duro-fix is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(2012).
83 495 U.S. 676.
84 Id. at 679 (“We address in this case whether an Indian tribe may assert criminal jurisdiction
over a defendant who is an Indian but not a tribal member.”).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 679–80. Duro was a member of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
Indians. At the time of the incident, Duro was temporarily living on the reservation with a
member of the Pima-Maricopa and was working for PiCopa Construction Company, which is
owned by the Pima-Maricopa tribe. The victim, a fourteen-year-old boy, was a member of the
Gila River Indian Tribe of Arizona. Id. at 679.
87 Id. at 681–82.
88 Id. at 684–86.
89 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
90 Id. (“The ‘powers of self-government’ means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and
tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and means
the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians.”).
91 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
92 Id. at 200.
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Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians in North Dakota, assaulted
a police officer while on the Spirit Lake Reservation, a reservation also
in North Dakota but of a different tribe.93 The tribe charged Lara with
the crime of violence to a police officer, and Lara pled guilty. 94
Subsequently, federal prosecutors charged Lara with assaulting a federal
officer.95 In the federal case, Lara argued that this second prosecution
was in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
To answer this question, the Court first had to decide whether the
authority recognized by Congress to try Indian non-member Lara
derived from inherent sovereignty, or from a delegation of
congressional power.96 If the power was delegated by Congress, the
federal prosecution would constitute a second prosecution by the same
sovereign and thus be in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.97
However, if the power derived from inherent sovereignty, then the
federal government, as a separate sovereign, could bring its own case
against Lara.98 In analyzing the ICRA amendment,99 recognizing tribes’
power to try non-Indians, the Court found that the tribe’s authority to try
Lara derived from inherent sovereignty because Congress did in fact
have the constitutional authority to lift the restrictions formerly applied
on tribal sovereignty.100 Thus, while Lara would have ordinarily had
double jeopardy protections,101 because two separate sovereigns brought
their own prosecutions, Lara could be tried for the same crime twice.102
While Lara has been hailed by many as a step toward increased
tribal sovereignty and self-determination, it stops short of paving a path
toward overruling Oliphant.103 The Lara Court carefully limited the

93
94
95
96

Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 197.
The Court phrased the issue as: “What is the source of the power to punish nonmember
Indian offenders, inherent tribal sovereignty or delegated federal authority?” Id. at 199 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. at 198.
98 Id.
99 The amendment states: “[The] powers of self-government. . . mean[] the inherent power of
Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 Lara, 541 U.S. at 197.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 210. The Court reasoned that under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a crime is
technically considered a crime against the individual sovereign. Since the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not prohibit successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns, here the tribe and the
federal government, the second prosecution by the federal government was not in violation of
Lara’s right to not be put in jeopardy for the same crime twice. Id. at 197.
103 Anna Sappington, Is Lara the Answer to Implicit Divestiture? A Critical Analysis of the
Congressional Delegation Exception, 7 WYO. L. REV. 149 (2007); David P. Weber, United States
v. Lara: Federal Powers Couched in Terms of Sovereignty and a Relaxation of Prior Restraints,
83 N.D. L. REV. 735 (2007).
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scope of its opinion.104 Specifically, the Court noted that it was not
required to decide in Lara what constitutional limits constrain
Congress’s power to expand inherent tribal sovereignty. 105 While the
Court did find that Congress had the power to expand the inherent
sovereignty of tribes to try non-member Indians, it has yet to weigh in
on the same question for non-member, non-Indians. And this is the
question that sections 904 and 905 of the Violence Against Women Act
of 2013 raise.
II. SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE JURISDICTION IS AN EXPANSION OF
INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A.

The Delegation Theory Versus the Inherent Sovereignty Theory

The scholarly Federal Indian law literature has identified two
camps for recognizing Congress’s power to enact the VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013:106 Congress can enact sections 904 and 905
either under a theory of delegation of congressional power,107 or under a
theory of inherent tribal sovereign power.108 Thus, the question the
104
105

Lara, 541 U.S. at 199.
Id. at 205 (“We are not now faced with a question dealing with potential constitutional
limits on congressional efforts to legislate far more radical changes in tribal status.”).
106 The Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54.
Recently, at least one scholar has approached this question from the perspective of “divided
sovereignty,” offering a unified theory for the sovereignty issues presented in Indian Country,
other U.S. territories, and the states. Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and
Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 660 (2013). Analysis of this
argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
107 Under this theory, the proposed amendments to VAWA would act as a specific act of
Congress, delegating jurisdiction to tribes to try non-Indian defendants. This theory argues that
tribes’ inherent sovereignty to try non-Indians is extinguished, and thus Congress is the source of
the jurisdictional power. Under this model, tribes must provide constitutional protections, and not
just the protections in ICRA and the TLOA to non-Indian defendants. See, e.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at
211 (Kennedy, J., concurring); SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at i (“It may be that Congress
can only delegate federal power to the tribes to try non-Indians.”); Gede, supra note 5, at 43–44;
Weber, supra note 103, at 761 (“[O]nce that power [criminal jurisdiction over non-members] is
delegated to the tribes, it must be treated as a delegation . . . .”).
108 The inherent sovereignty theory argues that tribes retain inherent sovereignty, and that
Congress may relax restrains it has put on this never-extinguished sovereignty. Lara, 541 U.S. at
199 (noting that Congress may relax the restrictions on a tribe’s inherent tribal sovereignty).
Because a theory of inherent sovereignty represents a reaffirmation of tribal self-governance and
self-determination, most scholars argue that the Court should uphold an Oliphant-fix under this
theory. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, STATEMENT OF THE MICH. STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW,
INDIGENOUS LAW AND POLICY CTR. ON TRIBAL LAW & ORDER ACT 8 (Nov. 10, 2011) (“We
recommend reaffirming and recognizing inherent jurisdiction.”); Ennis, supra note 7, at 553
(arguing that “tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians has been a dormant tribal power ever
since the tribes were incorporated in the United States, and . . . this power is merely held in trust
by the federal government until such time as tribes are able to assume such jurisdictional
responsibility”).

SAYLER.DENOVO - Clean - Final Copy (Do Not Delete)

18

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W DE • N OV O

1/3/2014 4:07 PM

2014

Supreme Court will have to answer upon a constitutional challenge to
this legislation is whether tribes still have inherent powers held in trust
by Congress to try non-Indians that pre-date the Constitution, or
whether they only have these powers pursuant to explicit delegation of
Congress.109
The argument under the delegation theory proceeds as follows: at
some point, implicitly or explicitly, 110 Indian tribes’ pre-colonial
territorial sovereignty to prosecute crimes committed on their lands was
completely extinguished.111 Congress subsumed this power, and like
other powers of Congress, Congress may also delegate it as it sees fit. 112
In sections 904 and 905, Congress delegated this power back to the
tribes.113 Under this theory, because the power is delegated, the
protections of the Constitution, including the full Bill of Rights, would
apply to any and all tribal adjudications.114
Under an inherent sovereignty theory, the tribe’s power to
adjudicate cases arising in Indian country was never extinguished.115
Rather, upon incorporation, Congress held this sovereignty in trust, and
is free to relax the restraints it placed on tribal sovereignty. 116 Because
this sovereignty derives its form and characteristics from the tribes’ precolonial, inherent powers as sovereign governments, it is not subject to
the Constitution.117 Rather, under this theory, when invoking
jurisdiction to try crimes committed in Indian Country, tribes would be
required to observe the statutory requirements of ICRA and the
TLOA.118 As scholars have pointed out, while the protections under
ICRA and TLOA provide important statutory due process rights, they
are not the same as the Constitutional rights that a defendant would
receive had he committed the crime on non-Indian land and was tried in
an Article III court.119 In sum, the question of inherent sovereignty
109
110

Weber, supra note 103, at 740.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see also Gede, supra note 5, at
40–42.
111 Gede, supra note 5, at 40–42.
112 Id.; see also SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 7.
113 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at i; Gede, supra note 5, at 40.
114 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 7; Gede, supra note 5, at 44.
115 Ennis, supra note 7, at 556–57.
116 Id. at 601.
117 Id.
118 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 15–16; Gede, supra note 5, at 42. These rights
include the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right of indigent defendants to assistance
of a licensed attorney, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, the right against double
jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy and public trial, the right
to know what the defendant is accused of, the right against excessive bail or fines, the right
against cruel and unusual punishment, the right to not be deprived of property without due
process of law, the right to trial by jury of no less than six persons when the offense is punishable
by imprisonment, and the right to petition a Federal Court for habeas corpus. See supra notes 59,
61, and accompanying text.
119 U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Gede, supra note 5, at 41.

SAYLER.DENOVO - Clean - Final Copy (Do Not Delete)

2014

1/3/2014 4:07 PM

B A C K TO B A S I C S

19

versus delegated power has important implications for both the practical
implementation of the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013, as well as the
validation of a policy of self-determination and greater autonomy in the
relationship between Congress and the tribes.120
From a tribal rights perspective, recognition of inherent
sovereignty would represent a victory for tribal self-determination.121
Under the inherent sovereignty model, rather than dictating what tribes
should do and how they should do it, the Courts and Congress would
recognize that to best promote Native peoples and communities, they
must allow tribes to determine and execute their own rules that are selfdesigned and reflect each tribe’s specific characteristics, including
population, land rights, culture, and traditions. It is against this
backdrop that the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 should be read as a
reaffirmation of tribes’ inherent sovereignty derived not from Congress
but from their original, pre-colonial sovereign status.
While federal Indian law has undulated through eras of promoting
and suppressing tribal rights,122 in arriving at this conclusion the Court
should return to the basic ideology and normative rules for tribal
sovereignty set forth in the Constitution and early case law.123 Applying
early concepts of tribal sovereignty to the legislative intent of the
VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013, the Court should find that Congress
has validly expanded the inherent tribal sovereignty to adjudicate nonmember, non-Indians with sufficient ties to the community who commit
crimes of domestic violence, dating violence, and sexual violence in
Indian Country.124
B.

Constitutional Support for the Inherent Sovereignty Theory

The language of the Constitution implicitly supports tribal
sovereignty.125 Indian tribes are mentioned three times in the
120 SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at i (“The dichotomy between delegated and inherent
power of tribes has important constitutional implications. If Congress is deemed to delegate its
own power to the tribes to prosecute crimes, all the protections accorded criminal defendants in
the Bill of Rights will apply. If, on the other hand, Congress is permitted to recognize the tribes’
inherent sovereignty, the Constitution will not apply.”).
121 Generally, few scholars of Native American law advocate for a delegation theory because
it supports further divestment of tribal sovereignty and self-determination. See Ennis, supra note
7, at 574.
122 See, e.g., Helen A. Gaebler, The Legislative Reversal of Duro v. Reina: A First Step
Toward Making Rhetoric a Reality, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1399, 1406–09; Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 758–59
(1989).
123 See infra Parts II.B–C.
124 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2011).
125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also
Tweedy, supra note 40, at 658–60.
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Constitution,126 and those provisions either exclude them from taxes or
representation, or mention tribes as parallel to foreign nations and
states.127 The text implies that tribes were considered by the Framers to
retain their separate, original sovereignty, and that “sovereignty
operates largely outside the Constitutional framework.”128
In Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution refers
to Indians regarding the representative and tax apportionment clause,
which explicitly excludes them from taxation: “Indians not taxed.”129
More substantively, tribes are mentioned in the Commerce Clause of
Article I § 8, which allows Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes.130 While Congress has interpreted this clause as general
free rein to pen laws affecting not only commerce but also general life
in Indian Country,131 a review of the Constitutional text reveals the
Framers’ understanding that tribes would retain their separate
sovereignty.132
In Article I § 8, Congress pairs Indian tribes with two other
government entities—the states and foreign nations.133 By grouping
tribes with other sovereigns, the Framers necessarily understood Indian
tribes to retain their separate sovereignty and thought that they should
be treated accordingly.134 The Framers further understood Indian tribes
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Tweedy,
supra note 40, at 665–66.
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
128 Tweedy, supra note 40, at 658–60; see also Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s
Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial
Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 419 (2003) (arguing that in excluding the states
from having jurisdiction in Indian country, the “Articles of Confederation and the Constitution
were the products of a continuous internal debate and interim attempts to resolve the western
lands and Indians problem”).
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
130 “The Congress shall have Power . . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
131 The first justification for the sweeping powers of Congress was in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553 (1903). In that decision, the Court insisted that Congress had plenary powers over
tribes. Id. at 565. Throughout the nineteenth century, the plenary power doctrine has been used to
decrease tribal sovereignty. Sappington, supra note 103, at 177; Weber, supra note 103, at 737.
While there has been much commentary on the negative effects of this plenary power, some
authors have argued that the Court may rely on the plenary power doctrine to uphold §§ 904 and
905 because they are beneficial to Native communities. Tweedy, supra note 40, at 663. Certainly
this broad historical reading insulates the VAWA amendments from a claim that the legislation is
not within Congress’s power to enact. However, this reading is not without its faults. By
recognizing the VAWA amendments through the plenary power doctrine, the Court would be
opening the door to the undesirable result of allowing Congress to not only expand tribal
sovereignty, but contract it as well. See infra Part III.
132 Resnick, supra note 122, at 691 (“To the extent Indian tribes are discussed in the
Constitution, they seem to be recognized as having a status outside its parameters.”).
133 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
134 Resnick, supra note 122, at 691–92. Resnick notes that the Constitution treats “Indian
tribes . . . as entities with whom to have commerce and to make treaties . . . . As many scholars
have discussed, one might describe the relationship between the Indian tribes and the United
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would retain their inherent sovereignty and powers of self-government,
and that Congress should be able to regulate trade with tribes, just like it
regulates trade between states or with foreign nations.135
The final portion of the Constitution relevant for federal Indian law
is Article II, § 2. This section states that the “[President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties . . . .”136 Treaty-making is an activity recognized between two
separate sovereigns, and the very first president extended this power
between Congress and the tribes.137 Moreover, both before and after the
Constitution was ratified, treaties were made with hundreds of Indian
tribes.138 These treaties affirmed tribes’ sovereignty, land base, and
hunting and fishing rights.139 Thus, the treaty clause through both its
text and practice provides an inference that Indian tribes were
considered separate sovereigns. The president’s power to make
treaties—and the widespread use of treaties in early Indian policy—
verifies early recognition that tribes, upon incorporation, still retained
their inherent tribal sovereignty.140
States as that between two sovereigns, and locate the relevant legal discourse as that of
international law.” Id. at 691.
135 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26 (2002).
136 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
137 In the words of one commentator:
Supreme Court and constitutional scholars have long recognized that the Framers
intended treaties to be the exclusive instruments of sovereign entities possessing
control over foreign affairs. Constitutional history shows the treaty power was intended
historically, functionally, and structurally to be exercised between sovereign entities,
and as long as the Supreme Court has been interpreting the Treaty Clause, the Court
has implicitly supported this requirement of sovereignty.
Erik Laakkonen, Note, Mistreating the Treaty Clause, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 237, 237–38
(2005) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.
2005)).
138 Phillip M. Kannan, Reinstating Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 809, 815 (2008) (“Until 1871, treaty-making was the predominate means of
implementing federal Indian policy.”); Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice
and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1620 (2000) (“[A]s an historical
matter, treaties with Indian nations and treaties with foreign nations share a common status: They
are negotiated accords between separate political sovereigns designed to secure the mutual
advantage of both parties.”).
139 Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 458 (“For Indian tribes, these treaties are foundational documents,
which affirmed tribal sovereignty over their lands and members, set the physical boundaries of
their reservations, and established their off-reservation fishing and hunting rights.”); Tsosie,
supra note 138, at 1620 (“The capacity of Indian nations to enter into treaties is a powerful
testament to their inherent sovereign authority as separate nations and governments.”).
140 Although the practice of treaty making ended in 1871, some authors have argued that laws
limiting the power to make treaties with Indian tribes are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Kannan,
supra note 138, at 811.
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Finally, no part of the Constitution states or implies the loss of
tribal sovereignty, or any absolute power of Congress to eliminate tribal
sovereignty.141 Rather, the Treaty Clause and Indian Commerce Clause,
coupled with the lack of any affirmative language to the contrary,
support the conclusion that the Constitution recognizes tribes as unique
and separate sovereigns, and that the Framers of the Constitution
considered tribes to retain that inherent sovereignty. 142
C.

Early Common Law Support for the Inherent Sovereignty Theory

Federal Indian law is notorious for being convoluted,
contradictory, counter-intuitive,143 and even “schizophrenic.”144 Within
the body of applicable case law, the Supreme Court in almost two
hundred years of jurisprudence has struggled to define (1) what
elements of pre-Constitutional sovereignty tribes still retain, (2) what
elements they have forever forfeited, and (3) what elements have been
limited, with the possibility of restoration by Congress. Under the
category of “retained powers,” the Court has found that tribes have the
right of occupancy of their land,145 to make their own laws without
Constitutional imposition,146 to tax,147 and to try non-member Indians
for crimes committed on Indian lands.148 Powers that have been forever
forfeited have been characterized as the power to engage in “external”
relations, including for example, the power to transact with foreign
countries.149 It is the third category—those inherent powers temporarily
limited by Congress—where there are possibilities for combating
domestic violence in Indian Country and contributing to federal Indian
jurisprudence through values of self-determination and self-governance.
While the Court has previously seemed to lean towards putting the
congressional power for sections 904 and 905 of the VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013 into the delegation box,150 the early case law,
like the Constitution, calls for the Court to find that by enacting these

141
142
143

Tweedy, supra note 40, at 663; see also Frickey, supra note 81, at 3.
Tweedy, supra note 40, at 662–63.
Nicolas, supra note 16, at 900. Commenting on the jurisdictional jurisprudence for civil
actions involving Indians or Indian Country, Nicolas observes: “[I]n no area of law are the[]
issues so complex and unsettled, the outcomes so harsh and counterintuitive . . . .” Id.
144 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
145 See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
146 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
147 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
148 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 193.
149 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our
Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006) (citing FELIX S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942)).
150 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 193.
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provisions, Congress has expanded the tribes’ previously curtailed
inherent tribal sovereignty.151
In the 1830s, the Supreme Court decided three cases involving
Indians that laid the initial foundation of federal Indian law. 152
Commonly referred to as the Marshall Trilogy because of their common
author, the decisions established that Indians have a right to occupancy
of homelands subject to extinguishment by Congress, 153 that Indian
tribes do not qualify as a foreign nation under Article III,154 and that
state laws do not apply in Indian Country. 155 These cases provide the
basis for the early understanding of tribal sovereignty and certain
canons of construction for Indian policy. 156 Since Chief Justice Marshall
wrote these opinions, federal Indian policy has at times strayed far from
its initial premises.157 And despite the paternalistic and, at times, racist
language present in all three decisions,158 these cases importantly
establish that tribes were not divested of their inherent sovereignty to
govern their own affairs upon incorporation into the United States.159
In Johnson v. McIntosh,160 the Court was asked to decide what
rights Indians have to their ancestral lands. After a lengthy discussion of
the European acceptance of the “doctrine of discovery,” and some of the
conquests of colonizing powers, the Court concluded that the United
States, too, accepted the doctrine of discovery, which gave title to the
colonizer subject to the occupancy of Indian tribes. 161 While much of
the decision reads as a supposed justification for the policies of
colonization, a close reading reveals that Chief Justice Marshall did not
consider tribes to have given up their internal sovereign rights. 162
Marshall noted that upon acquisition of title through the discovery
doctrine, tribes ceded their right to transact with other colonizers and
acknowledged the United States’ exclusive right to do so. 163 Thus, while
151 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
152 See supra note 151.
153 See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
154 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1.
155 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
156 Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s (Re)construction of the
Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 686 (2011); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the
Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 628–29 (2006).
157 Resnik, supra note 122, at 692–93.
158 Some authors have specifically examined the racist language in Court beginning with these
decisions. For a comprehensive discussion, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED
WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA
(2005).
159 See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
160 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
161 Id. at 586–87.
162 Id. at 574.
163 Id. at 573.
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Marshall recognized that tribes have lost their right to external relations
as sovereigns, he said nothing to diminish a tribe’s right to maintain its
internal sovereignty, including the tribe’s inherent power to try crimes
committed on its land. 164
The Court reinforced this holding in Cherokee Nation v. State of
Georgia.165 There the Court faced the question of subject matter
jurisdiction: was the Cherokee Nation a “foreign state” for purposes of
Article III?166 In the decision, the Court emphasized Indian tribes’
unique relationship with the federal government,167 and coined the term
“domestic dependent nations” to describe what Marshall considered to
be a guardian-ward relationship between the federal government and the
Indian Nations.168 With this definition in mind, the Court emphasized
tribes’ unique status as sovereigns that had relinquished their right to
externally trade or transact with other foreign powers, but still retained
their rights to govern their internal affairs.169 Although Marshall stated
that the Cherokee Nation “admit[ted] that the United States shall have
the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and
managing all their affairs as they think proper,”170 this observation was
further clarified in the final case of the Marshall Trilogy as referring to
the trade affairs of Native communities, and not their general, internal
affairs.171
The final case in the Marshall Trilogy is Worcester v. Georgia.172
The case also holds special importance for the question of inherent
tribal sovereignty because the Court was required for the first time to
specifically assess the nature of the tribes’ sovereignty in the context of
unilateral state action that affected Indian tribes.173 In Worcester, a
priest who resided on the Cherokee Nation’s land with the tribe’s
permission was charged with violating a state statute that prohibited
non-Indians from living on Indian land without state permission.174 The
Court found that the Cherokee Nation retained sovereignty from its
treaties to govern its internal affairs, and thus the state of Georgia could
not impose its laws on the Nation.175 In explaining its conclusion, the
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Frickey, supra note 81, at 9–10.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Id. at 553–54 (“To construe the expression ‘managing all their affairs,’ into a surrender of
self-government, would be, we think, a perversion of their necessary meaning, and a departure
from the construction which has been uniformly put on them.”).
173 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515-16.
174 Id. at 515.
175 Id. at 561 (“The Cherokee [N]ation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own
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Court characterized the tribes as “distinct, independent political
communities” that “retain[] their original natural rights,” except for
external interactions with other nations.176 Further, despite the
ethnocentric and paternalistic language177 characterizing the United
States government as the stronger power and tribes as the weaker, Chief
Justice Marshall also noted that tribes did not surrender their
independence upon taking the protection of the United States, but rather
still retain their sovereignty and right to self-government.178
Through the Marshall Trilogy the Court carefully explained that
while Indian tribes had given up their rights to external foreign
relations, they still maintained their internal, inherent sovereignty as
distinct nations and their right to self-government.179 Coupled with the
language of the Constitution, these early texts form a foundation that
recognizes that tribes’ inherent sovereignty was never extinguished.
However, in the wake of the Marshall Trilogy, both the Courts and
Congress began to stray significantly from these founding principles.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress implemented a policy of
assimilation, which included the Indian Removal Act of 1830180 and the
General Allotment Act of 1887.181 These policies of forcible eviction
and division of tribal lands, coupled with attempts to change Indian
culture, religion, dress, and land use practices, were enacted in hopes to
“assimilate” Native Americans.182 In 1924, Congress again pushed for
further assimilation of Native Americans through the Citizenship Act.183
From World War II until the late 1960s, these policies escalated into a
period now known as termination, where Congress terminated federal
support and derecognized tribes.184 In the midst of termination-era
policies, the movements of the 1960s began to take hold in Indian
policy as well.185 In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act,
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”).
176 Id. at 559.
177 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
178 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61.
179 Radon, supra note 68, at 1288.
180 Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411–12 (1830).
181 Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358 (2012)).
182 See Christina D. Ferguson, Comment, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day
Lesson on Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REV. 275, 283–84 (1993).
183 Gaebler, supra note 122, at 1407.
184 See, e.g., Dewi Ioan Ball, Williams v. Lee (1959)—50 Years Later: A Reassessment of One
of the Most Important Cases in the Modern-Era of Federal Indian Law, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV.
391, 392 n.2 (2010); Harry S. Jackson III, Note, The Incomplete Loom: Exploring the Checkered
Past and Present of American Indian Sovereignty, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 477 (2012). This era
included the implementation of P.L. 280 and the express termination of the sovereignty status of
several tribes. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Gaebler, supra note 122, at
1407–08; Resnick, supra note 122, at 692 n.97.
185 See Jackson, supra note 184, at 488–89.
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which marked a new era of self-determination in Indian Country.186
As the eras delineated above demonstrate, federal Indian law has
often strayed from the grounding of the Marshall Trilogy. 187 In fact,
many scholars have commented on the undulation of Indian law as the
Court and Congress have vacillated between very different policy
perspectives on Native Americans.188 However, scholars have also
noted that despite the lack of congruity in the case law, the founding
principles of the Marshall Trilogy still continue to define the bounds of
tribal sovereignty.189 Thus, in analyzing the Violence Against Women
Act of 2013, the Court should form the foundation of its analysis by
returning to the basics of the original texts that established federal
Indian policy: the Constitution and Marshal Trilogy. It is through this
lens that the Court should analyze the language of sections 904 and 905
and ultimately conclude that these provisions should be upheld as an
expansion of inherent tribal sovereignty.
D.

Legislative Support for the Inherent Sovereignty Theory

Since the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) in 1968,190
Congress has gradually recognized and affirmed more robust forms of
sovereignty and tribal rights as it has embraced tribal selfdetermination. After ICRA, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA),191 the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFRA),192 the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act (NAGPRA),193 and the Duro-fix amendments to ICRA.194 As this
legislation evinces, Congress has continued to identify, verify, and
confirm tribal governance rights to determine, enforce, administer, and
support their own laws, programs, cultural practices, and community
development.195
186
187
188

See Gaebler, supra note 122, at 1408–09.
Ball, supra note 184, at 393.
Id.; see also Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1174 (1990) (noting the
“incoherence” of Federal Indian law); Frank Pommersheim, A Path near the Clearing: An Essay
on Constitutional Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 403 (1991) (calling
Federal Indian law “bifurcated, if not fully schizophrenic”).
189 See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1589 (1996); Ball, supra note 184, at
391–94.
190 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (2012).
191 Id. §§ 1901–1963.
192 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
193 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013; 18 U.S.C. § 1170.
194 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
195 Scholars have generally commented on this trend, labeling it the “self-determination” era
of federal Indian law. In the words of one scholar, “modern-day congressional policy . . . eschews
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This trend continues in the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013. Both
the legislation passed in 2013 and the 2012 debates on the same
language demonstrate the intent of Congress to invoke inherent tribal
jurisdiction.196 The legislative intent is particularly clear here because
the Court has already interpreted similar language in construing the
Duro-fix in Lara,197 and in the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013,
Congress has re-employed the same language.198 In Lara, the Court
observed that Congress intended to derive the power to expand criminal
jurisdiction to non-member Indians from the tribe’s inherent
sovereignty.199 Similar to the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013, the
Court noted that the statutory amendment in Lara explicitly recognized
and affirmed the inherent sovereignty of tribes, and the legislative
history confirmed that Congress intended to recognize this power under
an inherent sovereignty, and not a delegation, theory. 200 The Court then
went on to cite committee reports from the House of Representatives
and the Senate, and senator and representative remarks from the
Congressional Record, all of which noted congressional intent to
recognize the inherent jurisdiction of tribes.201
Similar language and legislative record exist for the VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013, and the Court should similarly find that
Congress has validly expanded the bounds of the inherent tribal
sovereignty.202 First, the Court should examine the plain language of the
Act, which specifically states that the special jurisdiction derives from
an expansion of tribal sovereignty.203 Second, in comparing the
language present in the Act to the Court’s interpretation of similar
language in Lara, the Court should also find that sections 904 and 905
represent a valid expansion of inherent authority. 204 The legislation at
issue in Lara stated that “‘powers of self government’ . . . means the
inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to

state and federal incursions into tribal sovereignty . . . .” See Nicolas, supra note 16, at 901.
196 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1925 § 904 (2011).
197 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (“The statute says that it ‘recognize[s] and
affirm[s]’ in each tribe the ‘inherent’ tribal power (not delegated federal power) to prosecute
nonmember Indians for misdemeanors.” (alterations in original)).
198 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), with Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904.
199 Lara, 541 U.S. at 199.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54; Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted);
Violence Against Women Reactivation Act of 2013, H.R. 11, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted);
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2011); Violence
Against Women Act of 2012, H.R. 6625, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-480 (2012); S.
REP. NO. 112-153 (2012).
203 Ennis, supra note 156, at 624–25.
204 Lara, 541 U.S. at 193.
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exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”205 In the VAWA
Reactivation Act of 2013, the language states: “the powers of selfgovernment of a participating tribe include the inherent power of that
tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.” 206 Thus, the
Court has already recognized this language as validly invoking inherent
tribal jurisdiction; it should do the same here.
In addition, the language of the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013
contains significant legislative history from 2012 demonstrating that
Congress intended it to invoke inherent tribal sovereignty. In the Senate
Committee Report, published just before Senate Bill 1925’s passage, the
Senate majority noted that Congress does indeed have the power to
recognize and restore tribes’ inherent tribal sovereignty held in trust.207
As authority, the Senate majority invoked both Oliphant and Lara,
arguing that these cases give Congress the power both to determine
whether tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction and to expand their
inherent sovereignty to do so.208 This view is not exclusive to the
majority either: in their Minority Views Report rejecting sections 904
and 905, Senators Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and Coburn affirm that tribes’
powers derive not from the federal government, but from their own
inherent sovereignty which has never been extinguished.209
205
206

25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b)(1),
127 Stat. 54.
207 “Congress has the power to recognize and thus restore tribes’ ‘inherent power’ to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians and non-Indians.” S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 n.23.
208 Id. (“In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Court suggested that
Congress has the constitutional authority to decide whether Indian tribes should be authorized to
try and to punish non-Indians . . . . In United States v. Lara . . . the Court held that Congress has
the constitutional power to relax restrictions that have been imposed on the tribes’ inherent
prosecutorial authority.”). It should be noted that the senators that joined in the Minority Views to
Senate Bill 1925 disagreed with this conclusion. They believe that “the law today makes clear
that there is no inherent power of tribes to do anything of the sort the bill says . . . . Because tribes
lack this power, it is untrue to say that Congress can recognize and affirm it.” S. REP. NO. 112153, at 38.
209 Citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978), the Minority Views Report
explains: “American Indian tribes are regarded as deriving their powers from a ‘source of
sovereignty [that is] . . . foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and state
governments.’ The tribes’ powers are not delegated or created by the federal government—rather,
they are ‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’ ” S. REP.
NO. 112-153, at 48. After recognizing the inherent sovereignty of tribes, and thus the
inapplicability of the Constitution to tribal governments, the Minority View senators go on to
argue that tribes are not required to follow the Constitution. The senators highlight that tribes
need not follow the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments, that tribal governments do no follow
the principles of separation of powers, and that tribes do not need follow the same sovereign
immunity practices as state or the federal government. S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48–50. In an
interesting attempt to “turn the tables,” the Minority View Senators seem to argue that the
proposed amendments would create a “lawlessness” in Indian Country—when in reality the real
lawlessness is a result of decades of failed federal policies. Even if the Minority’s
characterizations were true, these facts are not relevant to the debate. Only if tribes’ adjudication
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The House Report for House Bill 4970, the 2012 House version of
the bill that ultimately did not include the special jurisdiction
provisions, commented on the omission of sections 904 and 905.210
While the House majority did not accept that Congress has the right to
expand tribal sovereignty because of the lack of constitutional
protections, they did accept the Senate’s statement that the special
jurisdiction derives from inherent sovereignty. 211
In addition to the explicit statements that the special jurisdiction
finds its source in inherent sovereignty, other provisions of the Act also
assume and reaffirm a non-delegation basis for jurisdiction.212 For
example, the Act guarantees the protections of certain due process rights
for all defendants prosecuted under its provisions.213 In reaffirming that
the source of power is non-delegated (and therefore does not require
Constitutional protections) the Senate majority confirmed that the rights
afforded to defendants under the proposed bill would derive from ICRA
and the TLOA.214
When the Court ultimately analyzes the language of sections 904
and 905, the Court should engage in a careful textual analysis of the bill
and its legislative history, using the Lara’s statutory analysis as a
model. The language of the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 and the
2012 Reports and Hearings reflect congressional intent to recognize
special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction through the tribes’
inherent sovereignty. Moreover, the language of the statute mimics
similar language already interpreted by the Court as reaffirming an
inherent sovereignty theory. The Court thus should find that the

powers are delegated by Congress does their compliance with the Constitution come into play.
And considering that these senators already acknowledged that the special domestic violence
jurisdiction at issue is derived from inherent sovereignty, these arguments highlighting the lack of
constitutional protections in tribal court are moot.
210 H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58 (2012).
211 “S. 1925 achieves its goal of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants by recognizing
‘inherent’ sovereign authority rather than by delegating Federal authority. Therefore, only ICRA
and TLOA apply.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at 58. Despite this observation, House Bill 4970
eliminates §§ 904 and 905 of Senate Bill 1925. In explaining why these provisions are not
necessary, the House Majority claims that domestic violence, and particularly inter-racial
domestic violence is not a problem in Indian Country. Id. at 59–60. The House Majority
specifically refutes many of the statistics universally reported in scholarly work, as cited in notes
5-6, supra, including the high incidence of domestic violence generally among Native women
and the high incidence of reported non-Indian perpetrators.
212 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904(b), (d)
127 Stat. 54.
213 Id. § 904(d).
214 “Rather than finding their basis in the Constitution, these rights are guaranteed through the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended in 1968 and 1990, and through the Tribal Law and
Order Act.” S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 10; see also S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 32 (“[904] effectively
guarantees that defendants will have the same rights in tribal court as in State court, including
due-process rights and an indigent defendant’s right to free appointed counsel meeting Federal
constitutional standards.”).
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legislative history and statutory intent mandate a conclusion that
Congress validly expanded inherent tribal sovereignty when it passed
sections 904 and 905.
III. COUNTER ARGUMENTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF PLENARY POWER
This Note has argued that in upholding the special domestic
violence jurisdiction provision of the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013,
the Court should recognize the legislation as validly invoking
Congress’s power to relax the restraints on tribal sovereignty. However,
this argument does not address the underlying basis of this power, and
the limits, if any, of Congress’s power to legislate in Indian Country.
Although, as argued above, the Marshall Trilogy215 laid out a
framework that affirmed tribes’ retained sovereign rights and unique
status, in the years following the 1830s, these ideas were selectively
applied, and, at points, completely ignored.216 Since then, treatment of
the tribes has “swung like a pendulum,” through eras of removal,
allotment, reorganization, termination, and self-determination.217 The
extensive policies—and their disparate approaches—in Indian Country
have been generally justified under the theory of congressional plenary
powers in Indian affairs, sourced in the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.218 While it is unlikely that legislation like that found in the
Act could be challenged under a theory that Congress does not have the
power to implement this type of legislation in Indian Country, 219 that
does not mean that upon constitutional challenge to the legislation, the
Court should rely on the plenary powers doctrine. Rather, the Court
should base the underlying authority for Congress’s power to relax the
restraints on inherent tribal sovereignty in the rational relationship test
articulated in Morton v. Mancari that requires acts of Congress that
affect Indian Country to be rationally related to Congress’s unique trust
obligations to the tribes.220

215 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
216 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. See also Resnick, supra note 122, at 692;
Gaebler, supra note 122, at 1406–07.
217 DUTHU, supra note 70, at 165.
218 Ferguson, supra note 182, at 276–77 (1993); Jones, supra note 43, at 137; Cleveland, supra
note 135 at 26; Frickey, supra note 188, at 1176.
219 See, e.g., Ennis, supra note 7, at 573.
220 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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Plenary Power and Sections 904 and 905

The plenary power doctrine is sourced in the Constitution.221
According to the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate
the commerce with the Indian tribes.222 This clause has over time been
effectively interpreted as a “free reign” over Indian affairs. 223 While
scholars argue that plenary power does not mean absolute or complete
power,224 the Court has consistently stated that issues of governance and
sovereignty are within Congress’s power to regulate, and has yet to
strike down legislation because it exceeded the powers delineated in the
Commerce Clause.225
Based on the argument in Part II of this Note, a sweeping
interpretation of Congress’s powers seems favorable when viewed
against the end goal of alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Indian
Country: affirming sections 904 and 905 under the plenary powers
doctrine does not leave room for a constitutional challenge to
Congress’s power to enact the legislation in the first place. However,
without addressing the means to that policy end, critics of the arguments
presented thus far could argue that the analysis in this Note fails to
address the underlying problems of plenary power, and in so doing,
actually validates a destructive doctrine which has often produced very
negative consequences in Indian Country.226
Advocating for the passage of the special domestic violence
jurisdiction, however, does not require validating the plenary power
doctrine. In 1974, the Supreme Court articulated a new test for the
constitutionality of congressional action in Indian Country. 227 In Morton
v. Mancari, the Supreme Court considered whether Indian hiring
preferences in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were
221
222

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Weber, supra note 103, at 737.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
223 The plenary power doctrine was first articulated in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886). MacKenzie T. Batzer, Note, Trapped in a Tangled Web United States v. Lara: The
Trouble with Tribes and the Sovereignty Debacle, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 283, 289 (2005). Since then,
Congress has used that power to implement policies in tribal lands, including, but not limited to:
forcibly evicting tribes from their homelands, dividing up tribal lands, usurping criminal and civil
jurisdiction from tribal courts, enacting civil rights legislation, specifying gaming regulations, and
determining adoption rights and practices. See DUTHU, supra note 70 at xv–xix.
224 Will Trachman, Comment, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering
Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 857–58 (2005).
225 Ferguson, supra note 182, at 279.
226 See, e.g., DUTHU, supra note 70, at 187–88. Not all scholars would take this approach
however. Some have argued that a legislative abrogation of Oliphant should be considered
consistent with the plenary powers doctrine. Ennis, supra note 7, at 573. Others have argued that
“as tribes appear to be stuck with plenary power for the time being, an exploration of the positive
uses that can be made of such power serves tribal interests.” Tweedy, supra note 40, at 663.
227 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974).
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unconstitutional.228 Rather than relying on blanket plenary powers, the
Court held that in order to determine the constitutionality of an act of
Congress, the Court must ask whether the action to be taken is rationally
related to the federal government’s unique fiduciary duties to Indian
tribes.229 This rule, the rational relationship test,230 expressed a basis for
Congress’s continuing power in Indian Country, while providing limits
to ensure that the policies implemented were consistent with Congress’s
trust relationship with tribes and the principles of self-determination.231
Today, Mancari provides a framework for validating the legislation
found in the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 under a theory of
inherent tribal sovereignty without blindly affirming the plenary powers
doctrine that has historically been so destructive in Indian Country.
B.

Morton v. Mancari and the Rational Relationship Test

In Morton v. Mancari, the Court was asked to decide whether the
Indian hiring preferences for the BIA as enacted in the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 were either necessarily repealed upon the
passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972232 or a
violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment.233 After
addressing the purpose of the hiring preferences and the lack of express
congressional intent to repeal them, the Court first concluded that the
hiring preferences were not repealed as a result of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act.234 The Court then moved on to address
whether the legislation violated the Fifth Amendment. 235 The Court first
explained that because of tribes’ unique status within the United States,
the federal government has trust obligations to act in the interest of
tribes.236 Although Congress has both explicit and implicit plenary
powers from the Commerce Clause, in keeping with its unique
relationship to the tribes, Congress may implement legislation which
treats tribes or tribal interests specially or differently, as long as this
different treatment is rationally related to Congress’s fiduciary
obligations to Native peoples.237 The Court therefore held that the hiring
228
229
230

Id. at 539.
Id. at 541–42.
Id. at 555 (“As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be
disturbed.”).
231 Id. at 553–54.
232 Id. at 545–47.
233 Id. at 551.
234 Id. at 547.
235 Id. at 551.
236 Id. at 551–52.
237 Id. at 551–52, 554.
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practices, aimed at furthering Native self-governance and policy
participation, should not be disturbed.238
In applying this reasoning to sections 904 and 905, the Court
should find that Congress has exercised its power consistent not with
the sweeping plenary powers that have characterized much of federal
Indian law, but with the more limited standard in Mancari, which is
more conscientious of Congress’s need to effectively execute its trust
responsibilities, while giving deference to Indian self-governance and
self-determination.239 Like the legislation in Mancari which addressed a
specific, identified problem and aimed to combat that problem through
purposeful legislation, 240 the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013 also
aims to ameliorate a defined problem in Indian Country which has
devastated Native communities,241 again through targeted legislation
which reflects Congress’s fiduciary responsibilities to tribes. By
recognizing the basis of the powers under the Mancari rational
relationship test, the Court will ensure that validation of sections 904
and 905 does not only create the right tools to combat the problem of
interracial domestic violence in Indian Country, but also implements
those tools in a way that affirms and amplifies tribal self-determination.
CONCLUSION
Statistics show that levels of domestic violence, sexual violence,
and dating violence have reached crisis proportions in Indian
Country.242 While scholars have long proposed an Oliphant-fix and
debated the source of Congress’s power to enact such legislation, since
the VAWA Reactivation Act of 2013’s recent passage, these debates
have converted from theoretical inquiries of proposed solutions into a
practical and timely interpretation of recent legislation that soon will
make its way into the courts.243 This Note proposes a method of
interpretation for this new legislation. It argues that in analyzing the Act
238
239
240

Id. at 554.
Id.
Id. at 554. The Court noted that “[t]he purpose of these preferences, as variously expressed
in the legislative history, has been to give Indians a greater participation in their own selfgovernment; to further the Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce
the negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.” Id. at
541–42 (footnotes omitted).
241 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
242 Id.
243 While the provisions of §§ 904 and 905 will not go into effect until March 7, 2015, tribes
may participate in a prior to that date in Pilot Project. § 908(b)(1). Under the Pilot Project, tribes
must have submitted preliminary expressions of interest to be designated as a participating tribe
on an accelerated basis by July 15, 2013; comments on these proposals were due on September
12, 2013. Pilot Project for Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence, 78 Fed. Reg.
35,961, 35,961–62 (June 14, 2013).
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and the source of Congress’s power to pass such legislation, the Court
should go back to the basic texts—the Constitution,244 the early case
law,245 and legislative history.246 In so doing, the Court should find that
sections 904 and 905 validly invoke inherent tribal sovereignty.
However, the Court should not stop its analysis there. In
addressing the inevitable application of the plenary power doctrine, the
Court should carefully delineate that the VAWA Reactivation Act of
2013 does not represent an exercise of the plenary power that has
typically characterized much of federal Indian jurisprudence in the
twentieth century, but rather falls into a more limited view of
Congress’s power consistent with its fiduciary responsibilities in Indian
Country.247 It is through this analysis that the Court should validate the
legislation on the twin prongs of inherent tribal sovereignty and limited
plenary powers, principles that reinforce Indian self-governance and
self-determination.
Although federal Indian law has been plagued by failed policies
and inconsistent case law, in considering sections 904 and 905, the
Court should not shy away from the opportunity to correct the mistakes
of the past, nor feel required to incorporate highly criticized case law
that exemplifies a misapprehension of tribes’ sovereign status. Partial
abrogation of Oliphant and recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty
will create at least two positive results: a practical mechanism to reduce
the rates of domestic violence, dating violence, and sexual violence on
Indian Country, and a resounding affirmation of tribal rights. It is
through a validation of Congress’s power as a fiduciary to enact
sections 904 and 905 under a theory of inherent tribal sovereignty that
the Court may contribute to not only the confirmation of tribal selfgovernance and self-determination, but also the growth of safer and
stronger Native communities.

244
245
246
247

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part III.

